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Abstract 
This study aims to test if employee diff and free cash flow can lead the desire of managers to manipulate the earnings in two 
different conditions: intensive monitoring and less intensive monitoring. Sample of manufacturing companies is taken from the list 
of Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2011 to 2013. Using multiple regression analysis, discloses that: in less intensive 
monitoring, managers tend to manipulate earnings when company has excess cash and the existence of employee diff. Monitoring 
system needs to be intensified especially for companies with the above characteristics.  
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1.  Introduction 
Earnings manipulation has been a negative trending topic in accounting literature, which is regarded as a tool for 
managers to fulfill their personal interest.  In this case, the managers change and manipulate profit, with the purpose 
of deceiving and misleading the view of the reader of financial statements, about the firms’ real condition (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). Manipulation in earnings incident that shocked the business world, such as Enron and Worldcom 
cases, has caused huge losses for businesses and the accounting profession. Public accounting profession has also 
received public attention and provokes public confidence, with respect to the failure of Arthur Andersen accounting 
firm in carrying out the functions of independent attestation. Not only abroad, earnings management cases also 
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occurred in Indonesia such as PT Ades Alfindo case, the case of PT Indofarma, Tbk, PT Perusahaan Gas Negara case, 
the case of PT Bank Lippo and Case of PT Kimia Farma Tbk (Sulistiawan, Januarsi, & Alvia , 2011, p . 53-64). 
Earnings management practice often creates agency problems, information asymmetry, losses, and the crisis of 
investor confidence (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
Past studies suggest the need to investigate the earnings management practices from two points of view, such as 
incentive view and monitoring view. From the incentive view, past study suggest that employee diff, that is the 
difference between employee growth and revenue growth, may influence a firm revenue fraud with a high risk. For 
example, Brazel, Jones, and Zimbelman (2009) find that the inconsistency patterns between non-financial measure, 
such as employee growth, and the financial measure, such as revenue growth, was higher for fraud firms than for non-
fraud firms. The company’s financial performance which is not parallel with non financial figures may be a clue to 
accounting fraud. This is still rarely investigated. 
Another incentive view, free cash flow can provoke earnings manipulation practices. Although theoretically there 
is no relationship between free internal operational funds with investment, but empirically there is correlation between 
excess cash and investment. Firm managers tend to use free cash flow as for investment rather than for dividends 
(Agrawal & Zong, 2006).  
Investments that have good prospects will benefit shareholders, and vice versa. But, for bad investment decision, 
there is a tendency the manager wants to cover up the firm poor performance from the view of the investors. To mislead 
the shareholders about the company's prospects, the managers may report the firms’ performance with earnings 
management practices (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2005). However, the influence of free cash flow on earnings management 
is rarely tested.   
Given the impact of losses incurred in an accounting manipulation case, the effective monitoring system is very 
important. Effective preventive measures will be able to reduce the cost of investigation and detection. Past studies 
show that good corporate governance may improve the monitoring system of the company. However, as accounting 
manipulation cases still remain a lot, many parties re-question the effectiveness of firm monitoring mechanisms. This 
study examines whether employee diff and free cash flow motivate managers to practice earnings management depend 
on the firm monitoring system. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1.  Earnings management 
Earnings management occurs because a manager uses the opportunity of his/ her actions to satisfy his/ her own 
interests (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The manager is responsible for the provision of the financial statements to show 
the performance of the company to the shareholders. In preparing these financial statements, the manager may use 
discretion in selecting accounting principles (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Managers select accounting principles to 
demonstrate the achievement of profit targets that reflect the prospects of the company in the future (Chung, Firth, & 
Kim, 2005). The manager may alter and manipulate the earnings numbers to obscure the view of investors about the 
real firm’ performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Since income manipulation is an ill-favored practice, it reduces transparency and increases fraudulent information. 
Earnings management which is done intentionally by managers could be considered as irregularities or fraud (Rezaee, 
2005). SEC in the United States revealed some large companies that go bankrupt caused by the manipulation practice 
of financial statements through earnings management (Rezaee, 2005).  
Managers manipulate earnings at the instigation of two motives. First, opportunist motives that managers change 
firm’ earnings figures to mislead investors to meet the manager's personal interests (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). For 
example, the manager changed the profit figures, in order to look better, by inclusion of expected revenues or defer 
losses (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The managers wish to get personal benefits, such as greater compensation, better 
reputation and higher stock prices. Higher profit figure is expected to obscure the view of investors, especially in 
making investment decisions. Second, the information motive, namely managers implements earnings management to 
convey their personal information and expectations about the future prospects of the company (Christie & Zimmerman, 
1994). For example, when a manager has personal information about the company's future prospects, the manager felt 
the need to change the profit figures in order to reflect better conditions. Whatever the motives of the manager, whether 
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opportunistic motives or information motives, cause the users of financial statements feel difficult to distinguish them 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Based on the previous discussion that the motive of the manager using earnings management 
is difficult to know, and then this study will describe the drives and the limitations for company’s manager to 
manipulate the accounting numbers. 
2.2. Incentives and monitoring of earnings management 
Earnings management practices can be seen from two factors: the incentive factor and monitoring factor 
(Bauwhede, Willekens, & Gaeremynck, 2003). An incentive is an encouragement or motivation, either financial or 
non-financial figure, which causes a person to involve an action. Some examples of incentive factor, which encourages 
the practice of earnings management, is asset utilization (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000), free cash flow (Chung, et al., 2005), 
the investment decisions (Richardson, 2005) and employee diff (Brazel et al., 2009). 
Monitoring is the control or limitation of managerial opportunistic behavior. Examples of monitoring factors, which 
may limit the managerial opportunistic behavior, are monitoring mechanism of corporate governance ((Wang & 
Campbell, 2012), ownership monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Koh, 2003) and supervision of the capital market 
(Chung et al. 2005). The presence of shareholders, who have interest and desire to oversee the management of the 
company, is expected to control the managerial behavior in choosing the accounting methods that benefit themselves. 
2.3. Employee diff and earnings management 
Several factors which drive the manager to change the profit to the level they wanted could be: huge losses, business 
failures, strong competition, and high growth. The manager wants to satisfy interested parties, the capital market and 
fulfill debt covenants. If a manager can convert the data on sales, revenues or profits, then he or she will also able to 
adjust non financial data, so that the action does not appear doubtful. But some non financial data can’t be set easily 
in a short time, for example: consumer satisfaction levels, number of employees, and number of facilities. The non 
compatible between financial data (such as revenue growth) and non-financial records (such as employee growth), 
which is called employee diff, could provoke suspicion that the company does not provide real financial information 
(Brazel, et al., 2009; Ames, Brazel, & Jones, 2012). Based on the above arguments, this study promotes hypotheses 1 
as below: 
H1: Employee diff is positively related with earnings management. 
2.4. Employee diff and earnings management 
Managers who use free cash flow for their own benefits rather than for the benefit of the shareholders tend to report 
higher earnings (Gul & Tsui, 1998).  They change the earning figure and conceal their opportunistic action. Although 
managers are authorized by the shareholders, to manage and control the company with an aim of maximizing the 
shareholders’ interests but some managers also promote his/hers own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
authorization gives managers the absolute power to act on behalf of shareholders.  When a firm possesses free cash 
flow, the firm manager is expected to decide on investing the free cash flow in profitable investment activities which 
generate high returns.   
The free cash flow theory anticipates, however, that managers often use free cash flow on investments with negative 
present values (Jensen, 1986).  This behavior may have a negative impact on the welfare of the shareholders because 
it may lead to earnings management practices that mislead shareholders believe that their manager always seeking 
high profit with their excess cash (Christie & Zimmerman, 1994).  There is a possibility that excess cash opens an 
opportunity to managers to practice earnings management (Chung et al., 2005; Gul & Tsui, 1998). Thus, managers 
practice earnings management to hide the real picture of company poor performance.  To confirm the possibility, 
hypothesis 2 is constructed as follows: 
H2: Free cash flow is positively related to earnings management.  
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2.5. Interaction  role of Institutional ownership (IO) 
Institutional shareholders, especially those that have a significant stake, have the power and incentive to oversee 
the company's operations as they are concerned with the performance and survival of the company (Koh, 2003). 
Institutional shareholders have the ability to express their views with regard to the prosperity of the company through 
the general meeting of shareholders, as a policy to distribute excess cash in the form of dividends. They also have the 
ability to acquire and process information to evaluate the firm performance and make investment decisions. Hence, 
institutional shareholders are believed to be able to limit earnings management practices, especially in companies that 
have excess cash or employee diff. 
2.6. Interaction role of Independent board (IB) 
The increasing the number of independent directors of board looks likes to be a good practice to limit the income 
manipulation (Wang & Campbell, 2012). Musteen, Datta, and Kemmerer (2010) found that independent board 
exhibited better reputations than that non independent board. The present of outsider director in board of directors, 
who have interest and desire to oversee the management of the company, is expected to control the managerial behavior 
in choosing the accounting methods that benefit themselves.  
2.7. Interaction role of Independent audit committee (IAC) 
Audit committee has a significant role in overseeing the financial reporting process. When there is a dispute between 
auditors and management, audit committee acts as the intermediary. To achieve the effectiveness of the audit 
committee responsibility, the SEC set rules on independence of audit committee members in order to carry out the 
task and to properly monitor the firm without pressure from the management. Independence is viewed as the important 
factor for encouraging the effective governance (Wang & Campbell, 2012). Thus, independent audit committee are 
expected to conscientiously monitor and control the earnings management practices, particularly in the condition 
where firms have high free cash flow or high employee diff. 
It may be stated that free cash flow (FCF) drives earnings management practices more among firms with low IO/ 
low IB/ low IAC compared to firms with high IO/ high IB/ high IAC.  Thus, it is hypothesized as follows. 
H3A: The interaction between FCF and IO affects earnings management  
H3B: The interaction between FCF and IB affects earnings management  
H3C: The interaction between FCF and IAC affects earnings management 
 
This study argues that employee diff is related with earnings management practices more among firms with low 
IO/ low IB/ low IAC compared to firms with high IO/ high IB/ high IAC.  Thus, it is hypothesized in the following 
manner. 
H4A: The interaction between employee diff and IO affects earnings management  
H4B: The interaction between employee diff and IB affects earnings management  
H4C: The interaction between employee diff and IAC affects earnings management 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample description 
The sample of this study is chosen from all manufacturing firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange, from 2011-
2013. The sample only includes firms with complete data for all selected variables for each year from the website 
www.idx.com which contains annual report information.  Table 1 describes the sample selection procedure which 
produces the test sample of 243 firm-year observations. 
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Table 1 Sample selection criteria 
 Number of firm-year 
Manufacturing firms (2011-1013) 420 
Firm listed on JSE inconsistently (27) 
Firm with insufficient data (42) 
Firm reporting losses (108) 
Test sample 243 
 
3.2. Operationalization of variables 
The study uses the Chen, Lee, and Li, (2008) and Chung et al. (2005) discretionary accruals to measure earnings 
management. The model for discretionary accruals (DAC) is as follows. 
 
୧୲ ୧ǡ୲ିଵΤ ൌ
୧୲ ୧ǡ୲ିଵ ൅ ୧୲ ୧ǡ୲ିଵΤΤ ……………………………………………………………….(1) 
 
Non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) are determined by the economic environment of the firms, i.e., the change in 
earnings after being adjusted by accounts receivables and property, plant and equipments (Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney, 1995). The difference between the expected and actual total accruals represents discretionary accruals 
(εit).  
 
୧୲ ୧ǡ୲ିଵΤ ൌ α଴ ሺͳ ୨୧ǡ୲ିଵሻ ൅ αଵሾሺΔ୨୧ǡ୲ିଵ െ Δ୨୧ǡ୲ሻ ୨୧ǡ୲ିଵሿ ൅ΤΤ αଶሺ୨୧ǡ୲ ୨୧ǡ୲ିଵሻ൅ε୨୧ǡ୲Τ  
…….…….(2) 
 
Table 2 summarizes the operationalization of variables under study. 
 
Table. 2 Variable Definition and Operationalization 
Variable Definition Operationalization 
Dependent Variable  
EM Earnings Management Discretionary accrual based on Modified Jones Model (Chen et al., 2008; 
Chung et al., 2005). 
Independent Variable  
FCF Free Cash Flow EBIT minus depreciation and amortization / Total asset beginning of the year 
(Chi, 2005). 
E_DIFF Employee Diff The absolute value of the difference between revenue growth and employee 
growth (Brazel et al., 2009) 
Variabel Moderating   
 Monitoring System 
IO Intuitional Ownership The percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders (Chung et al., 
2005). 
IB Independent Board  The ratio of independent board and the total number of board (Koh, 2003) 
IAC Independent Audit 
Committee 
The ratio of independent audit committee and the total number of audit 
committee (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). 
Control Variable  
DEBT Debt Debt to Total Asset Ratio (Chung et al., 2005). 
AUD Audit Quality Auditor Dummy, Big 4=1; Non Big 4 = 0 (Chung et al., 2005). 
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GROWTH Firm Growth  Price Earnings Ratio (Chung et al., 2005). 
The following equation (3) represents the model of this study. 
 
 ൌ Ƚ଴ ൅ Ƚଵ		 ൅ Ƚଶ		 ൅ Ƚଷ ൅ Ƚସ ൅ Ƚହ ൅ Ƚ଺ ൅ Ƚ଻
 ൅ Ƚ଼ ൅ ɂ 
…………....(3) 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistic 
Table 3 shows firm characteristics for the sample. The mean of discretionary accruals is 0.0877. The mean of free 
cash flow is 0.0433. The mean of employee diff is 0.2011. The average of institutional ownership is 28.86% of firms’ 
equity. The average of board independent is 38.68%. The variable PER has the highest mean with the highest standard 
deviation, it means that its variation is the largest. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Free Cash Flow 271 -,77 1,34 ,0433 ,20116 
Employee Diff 267 ,00 2,03 ,2011 ,24161 
Intuitional Ownership 250 ,00 ,94 ,2886 ,27044 
Board Independent 272 ,14 1,00 ,3868 ,11339 
Audit Committee 272 ,00 ,75 ,6273 ,13867 
Leverage 272 ,00 2,17 ,4396 ,25320 
Kualitas Audit 272 ,00 1,00 ,4338 ,49651 
Price Earnings Ratio  270 -50,80 181,38 16,2575 19,60860 
Earnings Management 272 ,00 1,28 ,0877 ,12074 
Valid N (listwise) 243     
 
4.2. Correlation analyses 
Summary of correlations test between the independent variables are shown in Table 4. A small number of 
independent variables are significantly correlated with each other. The magnitude of correlation coefficients is less 
than 0.183 (i.e., correlation between FCF and AQ), therefore, the correlations between independent variables should 
not affect the results of this study (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Table 4. Correlation test 
 FCF E_Diff IO IB IAC LEV AQ PER EM 
FCF 1         
E_Diff ,021 1        
IO -,041 -,049 1       
IB ,043 -,089 ,0535 1      
IAC ,021 -,068 ,0156 -,017 1     
LEV -,114 ,122 -,137** -,055 ,103 1    
AQ ,182*** -,079 -,0485 ,067 -,149** -,054 1   
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PER -,029 -,010 -,0030 ,103 -,065 -,028 ,077 1  
EM ,150*** ,216*** -,0844 -,022 ,011 ,109 ,008 ,109 1 
  
4.3. Regressions results 
Table 5 summarizes results of testing the regression models (Model 1-4).  Results on Model 1 show that free cash 
flow (FCF) has a significant positive relationship with earnings management (EM) at p < 0.01 (β=0.123; t=3.040).  
The result demonstrates the association between FCF and EM is in the same direction which is in accordance with 
past studies such as Gul (2001), Chung et al (2005), and Bukit and Takiah (2009).  The result supports hypothesis 1.  
As Brazel et al. (2009) suggested, this study also prove that employee diff (E_Diff) is positively associated with EM 
at p<.01 (β=0.098; t=3.066), consistent with hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 5. Regression results Model 1-4 
 Expected 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 DV: Earnings Management 
(Constant) ? ,014 
(,283) 
,014 
(,282) 
-,001 
(-,018) 
,015 
(,288) 
Free Cash Flow + ,123 
(3,040)*** 
,124 
(1,931)* 
,261 
(2,289)** 
,104 
(,311) 
Employee Diff + ,098 
(3,066)*** 
,098 
(3,060)*** 
,100 
(3,123)*** 
,098 
(3,017)*** 
Intuitional Ownership _ -,026 
(-,875) 
-,026 
(-,859) 
-,030 
(-1,017) 
-,026 
(-,875) 
Board Independent _ -,004 
(-,054) 
-,004 
(-,056) 
,034 
(,466) 
-,004 
(-,052) 
Audit Committee _ ,044 
(,733) 
,044 
(,731) 
,046 
(,757) 
,043 
(,701) 
Leverage + ,046 
(1,473) 
,046 
(1,469) 
,045 
(1,454) 
,046 
(1,471) 
Audit Quality _ -,003 
(-,184) 
-,003 
(-,182) 
-,001 
(-,043) 
-,003 
(-,178) 
Price Earnings Ratio  + ,001 
(1,688)* 
,001 
(1,683)* 
,001 
(1,707)* 
,001 
(1,685)* 
FCF*IO  
 
-,003 
(-,017)   
FCF*IB  
  
-,349 
(-1,294)  
FCF*IAC  
   
,029 
(,057) 
R2  0.105 0.105 0.111 0.105 
Adj. R2   0.074  0.070  0.077  0.070 
Notes: */ **/ *** is statistically significant at the 10% level/ 5% level/ 1% level 
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Results on Model 2, 3 and 4 in Table 5 incorporate the interaction effects of monitoring variables (i.e. institutional 
ownership, independent board, and independent audit committee) on the association between FCF and EM such as 
FCF*IO, FCF*IB, and FCF*IAC. When the variable FCF*IO is included in the Model 2, the direct relationship 
between FCF and EM is significant at p<0.10 (β=0.124; t=1.931).  The coefficient of the relationship is still positive 
but its significant level is lower (from p < 0.01 to p < 0.10).  It means that institutional ownership has the important 
role in monitoring the earnings management practices, especially in firms with high FCF. However, the coefficient of 
FCF*IO is not significant (β= -0.003; t=-0.017). The result does not support hypothesis 3A.  
Model 3 in Table 5 present the result of the coefficient of FCF*IB which is negative and not significant (β= -0.349; 
t=-1.294). When the variable FCF*IB is included in the Model 3, the direct relationship between FCF and EM is 
positive and significant at p < 0.05 (β=0.261; t=2.289). But the significance level of the coefficient FCF in the Model 
3 is lower than that in the Model 1. This result suggests that the independent board carry out the supervisory functions 
in controlling opportunistic behavior of managers when the company has surplus cash. However the coefficient of 
FCF*IB is still not significant. The result does not support hypothesis 3B. Similarly, after the variable FCF*IAC is 
included in the Model 4, the sign of FCF is positive and not significant (β=0.104; t=0.311). This result suggests that 
presence of independent audit committee could reduce the practice of earnings manipulation, especially when excess 
cash is available. However, its effect is still not significant which is inconsistent with hypothesis 3C. 
 
Table 6. Regression results Model 5-6 
 Expected Sign Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 DV: Earnings Management 
(Constant) ? ,021 
(,392) 
,117 
(1,978)** 
,019 
(,345) 
Free Cash Flow + ,122 
(3,013)*** 
,118 
(2,966)*** 
,123 
(3,018)*** 
Employee Diff + ,083 
(1,950)* 
-,541 
(-2,748)*** 
,084 
(1,252) 
Intuitional Ownership _ -,040 
(-,986) 
-,037 
(-1,273) 
-,026 
(-,881) 
Board Independent _ -,005 
(-,074) 
-,237** 
(-2,442) 
-,004 
(-,052) 
Audit Committee _ ,039 
(,642) 
,018 
(,310) 
,036 
(,519) 
Leverage + ,047 
(1,486) 
,064 
(2,044)** 
,046 
(1,474) 
Audit Quality _ -,003 
(-,213) 
-,007 
(-,456) 
-,003 
(-,200) 
Price Earnings Ratio + ,001 
(1,685)* 
,001 
(1,727)* 
,001 
(1,696)* 
EDIFF*IO  ,079 
(,508)   
EDIFF*IB  
 
1,734 
(3,286)***  
EDIFF*IAC  
  
,026 
(,230) 
R2  0.106 0.144 0.105 
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Adj. R2  0.071 0.111 0.070 
Notes: */ **/ *** is statistically significant at the 10% level/ 5% level/ 1% level 
 
Table 6 summarizes results of testing the regression models (Model 5-7). Results on Model 5, 6 and 7 in Table 6 
present the interaction effects of employee diff and institutional ownership (EDIFF*IO), of employee diff and 
independent board (EDIFF*IB), and of employee diff and independent audit committee (EDIFF*IAC); to their 
relationships with earnings management.  The results of this study show that the coefficient of EDIFF*IO (β=0.079; 
t=0.508) and EDIFF*IAC (β=0.026; t=0.230) are both insignificant in the Model 5 and 7. The direct relationship 
between employee diff and earnings management is still positive in both Model 5 (β=0.083; t=1.950) and model 7 
(β=0.084; t=0.230). The results suggest that the institutional ownership and independent audit committee weaken the 
positive FCF and EM associations. However, since the interaction effects are not significant in both model 5 and 7, 
thus these findings do not support the hypothesis 4A and hypothesis 4C. Subsequently, in the Model 6, independent 
board strengthens the positive relationship of employee diff and earnings management. This finding is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis 4B. 
5. Conclusion, limitations and recommendations 
The results of this study show that high free cash flow and high employee diff are important factors for manager to 
conduct earnings management. Therefore, it is needed to ensure that firms achieve better performance must use their 
free cash flow in profitable project that could avoid the tendency for them to misbehave themselves and get involved 
in managing earnings.  Furthermore, the reduced earnings management practices would bring the high correlation 
between the financial measures and non-financial measures. Thus, the present of institutional investors, independent 
director in board of directors and independent director in audit committee member have important monitoring role in 
controlling the earnings manipulation, especially in surplus cash firms and high employee diff firms. Still, this study 
does not present strong evidence of the effective monitoring role of institutional investor, independent board and 
independent audit committee in explaining the effect of excess cash flow and employee diff on earnings management.   
The results offer some practical implications on policy making.  The regulatory bodies need to be aware of the 
possibility of certain misbehavior among firms’ managers when excess cash is available and or employee diff is high.  
The use of excess cash on an unprofitable project could cause the company suffered losses, so that the manager may 
obscure it by practice the income manipulation that may affect the financial reporting quality. Also, the inconsistent 
pattern between financial measures and nonfinancial measures may also indicate that the practice of earnings 
manipulation occurs. Thus, a precautionary monitoring measure needs to be put in place to protect shareholders’ 
interests and to improve the quality of reporting. 
Measurements for some variables under study which were adopted from other previous studies may be improved.  
For instance, the measurement of earnings management used in this study as what is widely used previously may be 
able to differentiate between the practice of managing earnings resulting from opportunistic behavior of the managers 
or from the discretionary action of the management to provide internal information.  Using firms of manufacturing 
industry listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange may limit the generalizability of the results to other firms.  Thus, 
results may be used with caution.  
Finally, this study explains the suggestion for future research to search for a better measure of monitoring system. 
Future research may address the issue of earnings management practices which is motivated by the availability of 
surplus cash and the existence of employee diff when there is good monitoring system by testing their relationships 
simultaneously using the structural equation model which is expected to produce a better result as a result of higher 
testing power and lower testing errors.  For instance, the influence of excess cash and employee diff on the earnings 
management may need to be investigated in more than one situation in order to evaluate whether any monitoring 
mechanism would be able to reduce such behavior of the management. 
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